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INFANTS-PARENT AND CHILD: APPLYING THE REBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTION AGAINST AWARDING CUSTODY TO
PERPETRATORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1995)
I. FACTS
In early 1989, Plaintiff-Appellee, Shane Heck [hereinafter Heck],
and Defendant-Appellant, Christie Reed [hereinafter Reed], began a
romantic relationship at the ages of nineteen and sixteen, respectively.'
By the fall of 1990, Heck and Reed were living together. 2 The couple
had two children out of wedlock: Shana Rae Heck, born October 20,
1991, and Steven Shane Heck, born October 14, 1992.3
Their tumultuous relationship included several incidents of domes-
tic violence.4 According to Reed, Heck pushed and threw her around on
several occasions.5 He also punched her in the face once, causing her
nose and mouth to bleed and swell. 6 On another occasion, he pulled out
her hair, leaving a bald spot. 7 He also tore ligaments in her leg during
an argument, forcing her to seek medical treatment.8 Furthermore, Reed
stated that Heck subjected her to verbal abuse throughout the relation-
ship, including being called names and being belabored with profanity.9
As a result of these episodes, Reed obtained a temporary Adult
Abuse Protection Order on March 4, 1991, through the Adult Abuse
Center in Grand Forks.10 Reed allegedly violated the order herself by
going to Heck's apartment and subsequently requested the temporary
order be dropped.11 Reed obtained a second Protection Order in Decem-
ber, 1992 after Heck retrieved Shana from Reed's residence without
incident. 12 Again, Reed did not follow up with a formal judicial review
of her application.13
1. Brief for Appellee at 1, Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1995) (No. 940117).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Brief for Appellant at l, Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1995) (No. 940117).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 16.
7. Id.
8. Id. Heck alleged that he acted in self-defense as Reed had attempted to kick him in the groin
during a verbal confrontation. Brief for Appellee at 8, Heck (No. 940177).
9. Brief for Appellant at 16, Heck (No. 940117).
10. Brief for Appellee at 7, Heck (No. 940117).
11. Id. at 8.
12. Id. The apppellee's brief provides no explanation for the issuance of the second protection
order. Id.
13. Id. Reed stated that she did not press formal charges as Heck promised to reform his ways.
Brief for Appellant at 10, Heck (No. 940117).
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Moreover, Heck alleged that Reed committed domestic violence. 14
Heck stated that Reed physically assaulted him by punching and shoving
him on one occasion.1 5 This allegation was substantiated in a letter
written by Reed to Heck apologizing for the incident. 16 Despite the
evidence of domestic violence between Heck and Reed, there was no
evidence that any violence was ever directed toward the children.17
After several break-ups and reconciliations, Heck and Reed perma-
nently separated in November of 1992.18 Shana remained with Heck
and Steven resided with Reed. 19 Heck initiated legal action, seeking sole
custody of both children. 20 Reed responded by seeking sole physical
and legal custody of the children.2 1 The trial court granted Heck sole
physical custody of both children.22 The issue on appeal was whether
the trial court properly applied the rebuttable presumption against
awarding custody to the Plaintiff-Appellee, a perpetrator of domestic
violence. 23 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the decision of the trial court, holding that the rebuttable presumption
against awarding custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence may be
overcome only by compelling circumstances. 24
II. LEGAL HISTORY
In 1979, North Dakota enacted its first "best interests" statute
which provided that an order for custody of a minor child must promote
the best interests and welfare of the child.25 The 1979 best interests
statute26 listed ten factors for trial courts to consider when awarding
custody.27 At that time, the legislature did not address whether evidence
14. Brief for Appellee at 8, Heck (No. 940117).
15. Id. Sworn testimony of a third party corroborated that Heck simply walked away after Reed
punched and shoved him. Id.
16. Id. at 9.
17. Brief for Appellant at 17, Heck (No. 940117).




22. Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155,158 (N.D. 1995).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 166.
25. Award of Custody, ch. 194, sec. 3, 1979 N.D. Laws 423. The 1979 best interests statute was
amended to address the issue of domestic violence in 1989, 1991, and 1993. To avoid confusion, each
amended version will be referred to according to the year in which it was enacted.
26. Id.
27. Id. The 1979 version of the statute listed the factors to be considered, when applicable, as:
1. The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parents and child.
2. The capacity and disposition of the parents to give the child love, affection, and
guidance and to continue the education of the child.
3. The disposition of the parents to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, or
other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in lieu of
156 [VOL. 72:155
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of domestic violence should have an impact on a determination of the
best interests of the child.28
A. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BEST INTERESTS STATUTE
The 1979 best interests statute was amended in 198929 to require
courts to consider evidence of domestic violence. 30 The major premise
of the 1989 amendment was that, even if not directed at the child, any
abuse in the household affects the child.31 Recognizing that evidence of
domestic violence was often ignored by judges when awarding custody, 32
the 1989 amendment 33 mandated that judges consider evidence of
domestic violence if presented. 34
The 1989 best interests statute was amended in 199135 to require
judges to cite specific findings of fact when credible evidence of domes-
medical care, and other material needs.
4. The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the
desirability of maintaining continuity.
5. The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home.
6. The moral fitness of the parents.
7. The mental and physical health of the parents.
8. The home, school, and community record of the child.
9. The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient
intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a preference.
10. Any other factors considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody
dispute.
Id.
28. Id. Under current North Dakota law, domestic violence is defined as:
physical harm, bodily injury, sexual activity compelled by physical force, assault, or the
infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, sexual activity compelled by
physical force, or assault, not committed in self-defense, on the complaining family or
household members.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01(2) (Supp. 1995).
29. Domestic Violence in Custody Determinations, ch. 178, sec. 2. 1989 N.D. Laws 547.
30. Id. As amended in 1989, a court was to consider, when applicable:
j. The existence of domestic violence. If the court finds that domestic violence has
occurred, the court shall provide for a custody arrangement that best protects the child
and the parent or other family or household member who is the victim of domestic
violence from any further harm....
k. The interaction and interrelationship, or the potential for interaction and
interrelationship, of the child with any person who resides in, is present, or frequents the
household of a parent and who may significantly affect the child's best interests. The
court shall consider that person's history of inflicting, or tendency to inflict, physical
harm, bodily injury, assault, or the fear of physical harm, bodily injury, or assault, on
other persons.
Id.
31. Hearing on S.B. 2398, House Comm. on Judiciary, House Standing Comm. Minutes, 51st Leg.
Sess. 1 (March 6, 1989) (statement of Bonnie Palecek, N.D. Council on Abused Women's Services).
32. Hearing on S.B. 2398, Senate Comm. on Judiciary, Senate Standing Comm. Minutes. 51 st
Leg. Sess. 1 (January 31, 1989) (statement of Bonnie Palecek, N.D. Council on Abused Women's
Services).
33. Domestic Violence in Custody Determinations, ch. 178, sec. 2, 1989 N.D. Laws 547.
34. Id. See also Hearing on S.B. 2398, House Comm. on Judiciary, House Standing Comm.
Minutes, 51 st Leg. Sess. 2 (March 6, 1989) (statement of Representative Shaft).
35. Evidence in Custody Decisions, ch. 148, sec. 2, 1991 N.D. Laws 413.
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tic violence was found.36 These findings were to demonstrate that the
custody arrangement best protected the child and victim from further
harm.37 As such, judges were required to show what consideration had
been given to the history of violence. 38 The change was necessary
because evidence of domestic violence was often not included as part of
the record. 39
In 1991, the North Dakota Legislature amended section 14-05-22
of the North Dakota Century Code 40 to create a rebuttable presumption
that awarding custody to an abusive parent was not in the best interests of
the child. 41 At a minimum, the abusive party's propensity for violence
would be taken into account. 42 In effect, this 1991 amendment was
intended to force judges to consider evidence of domestic violence when
awarding custody. 43
B. IMPACT OF THE 1991 REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
The North Dakota Supreme Court had its first opportunity to apply
the 1991 amendment soon after its enactment. This opportunity came in
Schestler v. Schestler,44 where the trial court found that the father had
sometimes abused the mother by hitting and pushing her.45 The trial
court applied the rebuttable presumption 46 against awarding custody to
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. See also Hearing on S.B. 2355. House Comm. on Human Servs. & Veterans Affairs,
House Standing Comm. Minutes, 52d Leg. Sess. 2 (March 4, 1991) (statement of Bonnie Palecek, N.D.
Council on Abused Women's Services) (expressing that the senate bill would require judges to
demonstrate what weight was given to evidence of domestic violence).
39. Testimony on S.B. 2355, House Human Servs. & Veterans Affairs Comm., House Standing
Comm. Minutes, 52d Leg. Sess. 2 (March 4, 1991) (statement of Bonnie Palecek, N.D. Council on
Abused Women's Services); see also Testimony on S.B. 2355 House Human Servs. & Veterans Affairs
Comm., House Standing Comm. Minutes. 52d Leg. Sess. 1 (January 29, 1991) (statement of Dena 0.
Filler, Executive Director of the Domestic Violence Crisis Center) (stating that judges often ignored
the 1989 amendment).
40. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22(3) (1991) (amended 1993).
41. Id. (affecting visitation rights as well). See also H.R. Con. Res. 172, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990) (expressing the sense of Congress that credible evidence of spousal abuse should create a
statutory presumption that awarding custody to the abusive spouse is detrimental to the child).
42. Testimony on S.B. 2355, House Human Servs. & Veterans Affairs Comm., House Standing
Comm. Minutes, 52d Leg. Sess. (March 4, 1991) (statement of Bonnie Palecek, N.D. Council on
Abused Women's Services).
43. Testimony on S.B. 2355, House Human Servs. & Veterans Affairs Comm., House Standing
Comm. Minutes, 52 Leg. Sess. 3 (March 4. 1991) (statement of Representative Svedjan). See also id.
(statement of Representative Peterson) (stating that judges were unwilling to consider evidence of
domestic violence when awarding custody unless mandated by statute).
44. 486 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1992).
45. Schestler v. Schestler, 486 N.W.2d 509, 512 (N.D. 1992). The trial court also found that the
father had inappropriately touched two of the female children. Id. Both of the children were from the
mother's previous relationship. Id. at 510.
46. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22(3) (1991) (amended 1993).
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the father 47 and concluded that the presumption had been rebutted. 48
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, 49
holding that domestic violence has no priority over the other statutory
best interest factors to be considered when awarding custody.50
The majority in Schestler recognized that the legislative history of
the 1991 amendment 5' reflected the legislature's concern with domestic
abuse.52 Despite this, the majority found that neither the statute nor the
legislative history indicated a priority for credible evidence of domestic
violence over the other statutory factors.53 In addition, the court indicat-
ed that the presumption against awarding custody to a perpetrator of
domestic violence would continue until the fact presumed was found,
from credible evidence, not to exist.54 Under this view, the domestic
violence presumption could be rebutted by a customary weighing of the
best interests factors.55
In Schestler, Justice Levine dissented to what she characterized as
the majority's "misapplication" of the rebuttable presumption. 56 Justice
Levine also stated that the court's decision "undermined" and "contro-
verted" the legislative intent behind the 1991 amendment by placing the
domestic violence factor on equal footing with the other statutory factors
to be considered. 57 Justice Levine emphasized that only the domestic
violence factor was graced with a presumption and stressed that it must
be given greater consideration than the other factors.58 According to
Justice Levine, "the presumption (and the legislative intent fueling it)
must not be so trivialized that it can be overcome simply by evidence of
other statutory factors weighed in favor of the perpetrator because if that
47. Schestler, 486 N.W.2d at 512.
48. Id. The trial court found that the father had never directed violence toward the children; that
the father had "a more stable home environment;" that there was more love and affection between the
father and the children than between the mother and the children; that the father's family would aid
the father in caring for the children; and that there was concern for the children's safety in the
mother's home. Id.
49. Id. at 513.
50. Id. at 511.
51. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)0) (1991) (amended 1993).
52. Schestler v. Schestler, 486 N.W.2d 509, 511 (N.D. 1992). The majority opinion was written
by Justice Johnson who was not a member of the North Dakota Supreme Court at the time Heck was
decided. Id. at 509.
53. Id. at 511.
54. Id. at 512 (citing N.D.R. EVID. 301(a) (stating that unless provided for by statute, a
presumption is rebutted and ceases to operate when the fact presumed is found not to exist by credible
evidence)).
55. Id. at 512.
56. Id. at 513. (Levine, J., dissenting).
57. Schestler v. Schestler, 486 N.W.2d 509,515 (N.D. 1992) (Levine, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
1996]
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were the case, the presumption would add nothing to the resolution of
custody disputes." 59
C. 1993 AMENDMENT TO THE BEST INTERESTS STATUTE
As a result of the Schestler decision, the 1991 best interests statute
was again amended in 1993.60 The 1993 amendment 61 evidenced a
growing trend toward explicitly giving priority to the issue of domestic
violence when raised in custody determinations. 62 This latest amend-
59. Id. Justice Levine penned the majority opinion in Heck which expressly rejected the
approach taken in Schestler. Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155, 155 (N.D. 1995).
60. Letter from Bonnie Palecek, Executive Director, North Dakota Council on Abused Women's
Services, to Senator Maxon (Feb. 10, 1993) (on file with author).
61. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(l)(j) (1991 & Supp. 1995). The 1993 amendment altered the
wording of the domestic violence factor to read, in part, as follows:
j. Evidence of domestic violence. In awarding custody or granting rights of visitation, the
court shall consider evidence of domestic violence. If the court finds credible evidence
that domestic violence has occurred, this evidence creates a rebuttable presumption that
a parent who has perpetrated domestic violence may not be awarded sole or joint
custody of a child.
Id.
62. Id. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332(F) (1991 & Supp. 1994) (stating that a significant
history of domestic violence will preclude an award of joint custody); COLO. REV. STAT. §
14-10-124(1.5)(1)-(m) (1987) (expressing that joint custody is not in the best interests of the child if
one parent is found to have committed domestic violence unless "the parents are able to make shared
decisions" without further violence); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West Supp. 1996) (stating that
conviction for a felony involving domestic violence creates a rebuttable presumption of detriment to
the child and, if not rebutted, the convicted parent shall not be granted "shared parental
responsibility"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(A) (West Supp. 1995) (creating a rebuttable presumption
that a parent with history of domestic violence will not be given sole or joint custody unless rebutted by
a preponderance of the evidence showing completed treatment and a requirement of that parent's
participation as custodian); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(2)(d) (West Supp. 1996) (stating that evidence
of domestic violence creates a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is not in the best interests of
the child); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112.2 (West Supp. 1996) (stating clear and convincing evidence
of ongoing domestic abuse creates a rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to the abusing
parent); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 26.09.191(2)(a)(iii), (d)(i) (West Supp. 1996) (stating that a court
shall limit residential time or, if such limitation does not adequately protect the child, eliminate an
abusive parent's contact with the child); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(2)(c) (West 1993) (expressing that
a rebuttable presumption against future cooperation between the parents is created which may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence).
In twenty-five other state jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia, evidence of domestic
violence is listed as a factor to be considered when awarding custody; although it is not given priority
over other factors: ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(7) (1995); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011(b) (West 1994);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722(a)(7) (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a)(5)(F) (1989 & Supp. 1995);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(9) (1995); IDAHO CODE § 32-717(A)(7) (1983 & Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 750, para. 5/602(a)(6) (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(B)(vii)
(1994); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(l)(f), (2) (Michie 1984 & Supp. 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
TIT. 19, § 214(5)(K-1) (West 1981 & Supp. 1995); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-101.1(b) (1991);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
722.23(3)(k) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(1)(f) (1993); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 42-364(2)(d) (Supp. 1994); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.480(4)(c) (Michie 1993); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 458.17(II)(c) (1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 1993); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§
3109.04(F)(l)(h), (F)(2)(c) (Anderson 1989 & Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137(l)(d) (1995);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 5303(a) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16(G) (Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.




ment dictated that the presumption against awarding custody to a perpe-
trator of domestic violence could be rebutted only by showing, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the best interests of the child require the
perpetrator to serve as custodian. 63  The North Dakota Legislature
sought to strengthen the domestic violence factor by raising the level of
proof required to rebut the presumption from credible evidence to clear
and convincing evidence. 64 As such, the legislature expressly gave the
domestic violence factor priority over the other statutory factors to be
considered when awarding custody.65
III. CASE ANALYSIS
In Heck v. Reed,66 the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the
rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a perpetrator of
domestic violence. 67 The court clarified the proper application of the
presumption and the level of evidence necessary to rebut it.68 On appeal,
Reed argued that the trial court did not properly consider the evidence
of domestic violence and therefore, the trial court's finding that the
statutory presumption had been rebutted was clearly erroneous. 69
Prior to the 1993 amendment, evidence of domestic violence was
not given priority and could be overcome by one or a combination of
the other factors. 70 According to the court, the legislature clearly
intended this presumption not to be overcome by balancing the other
factors in the perpetrator's favor.7 1 Such a balancing would merely
demonstrate that the perpetrator may be a fit parent in other respects.72
Rather, the legislature intended that the presumption be defeated only by
a showing that the best interests of the child "demand" that the perpe-
trator serve as custodial parent.73 In order to rebut the presumption by
63. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1) 0 ) (1991 & Supp. 1995).
64. Id. See also Hearing on H.B. 1393, Senate Human Servs. Comm., Senate Standing Comm.
Minutes, 53 Leg. Sess. 2 (March 10, 1993) (statement of Bonnie Palecek, N.D. Council on Abused
Women's Services).
65. Hearing on H.B. 1393, Senate Human Servs. Comm., Senate Standing Comm. Minutes, 53
Leg. Sess. 2 (March 10, 1993) (statement of Senator Lindgren).
66. 529 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1995).
67. Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155,159 (N.D. 1995).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 159. A trial court's findings on matters of child custody are findings of fact which will
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Id. (citing N.D.R. Civ. P. 52(a) (stating that the clearly
erroneous standard of review shall be employed when reviewing findings of fact)). "A finding of fact
is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support it,
or if the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made." Id. (citing Dalin v. Dalin, 512 N.W.2d 685, 687 (N.D. 1994)).
70. Id. at 162.
71. Id.
72. Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155, 163 (N.D. 1995).
73. Id. at 162. The majority noted that the word "'require' ... denote[d] compulsion; . ..
1996]
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clear and convincing evidence, a perpetrator would have to establish
compelling or exceptional circumstances requiring he or she be awarded
custody .74
In addition, the court interpreted the 1993 best interests statute as
precluding from consideration an absence of violence against the
children as one factor which may rebut the presumption. 75 The majority
noted that domestic violence is defined in terms which recognize the
effects of the violence on family or household members, not just the
child.76 The court opined that if the legislature intended to limit the
application to harm inflicted directly to children, it would have
employed a phrase such as "child abuse," to trigger the rebuttable
presumption .77
The court relied upon research which indicated that even if children
are not the direct targets of domestic violence, the abusive climate
created by violence between the parents nonetheless victimizes the
child.78 The majority reasoned that the 1993 best interests statute was
grounded in public policy and reflected a legislative finding that the
presence of domestic violence in the home has an adverse effect on
children. 79 According to the court, the North Dakota Legislature
intended for courts to presume that children are negatively impacted by
mean[ing] "to 'insist upon' or 'demand."' Id. (citing WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1208 (2d
College ed. 1980)).
74. Id. at 162-63. The court drew a parallel to custody modification cases in which sufficiently
compelling reasons are required before the stability of the custodial placement will be upset. Id. at
162. (citing Dalin v. Dalin, 512 N.W.2d 685, 687 (N.D. 1994)). See also Alvarez v. Carlson, 524
N.W.2d 584, 589 (N.D. 1994) (stating that one must demonstrate a significant change of
circumstances so adversely affecting the child that a 'change in custody is necessary before a custodial
placement will be upset).
75. Heck, 529 N.W.2d at 163.
76. Id. Instead, the legislature defined family or household members to include:
a spouse, family member, former spouse, parent, child, persons related by blood or
marriage, persons who are in a dating relationship, persons who are presently residing
together or who have resided together in the past, persons who have a child in common
regardless of whether they are or have been married or have lived together at any time.
and, for the purpose of the issuance of a domestic violence protection order, any other
person with a sufficient relationship to the abusing person as determined by the court
under section 14-07.1-02.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01(4) (1991 & Supp. 1995).
77. Heck, 529 N.W.2d at 163 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-02(2) (1989 & Supp. 1995)
(defining an abused child as "an individual under the age of eighteen who [suffers] from serious
physical harm or traumatic abuse caused by other than accidental means by a person responsible for
the child's health or welfare")).
78. Id. at 163 (citing LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 59 (1984) (stating
that eighty-seven percent of the battered women interviewed reported an awareness by the children
of the violence in the home)).
79. Id. at 163-64 (citing HR. Con. Res. 172, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (expressing a legislative
finding that children suffer from impairment of self-esteem and developmental and socialization skills,
among other conditions, even if they don't witness the spousal abuse firsthand)); see also 136 CONo.
REC. H8280 (daily ed., Sept. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Miller) (stating that children's emotional
well-beings are endangered by witnessing domestic violence inflicted against their parents even when
they are not themselves physically harmed).
162
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domestic violence.8 0 Therefore, the court found it clearly erroneous for
the trial court to consider that there was never any abuse of the children
as a factor rebutting the presumption.
8'
The court further noted that domestic violence is a learned pattern
of behavior which requires sufficient motivation for change on behalf of
the perpetrator to be "unlearned." 82 As evidence of such motivation,
the court looked to whether Heck had participated in domestic violence
counseling and whether there had been a passage of time with no acts of
domestic violence 8 3 While realizing this was not a perfect solution to the
domestic violence cycle, the court stated that such evidence may support
a finding that future domestic violence was unlikely.84 The court found
it clearly erroneous to conclude, in the absence of such evidence, that
Heck would no longer perpetrate domestic violence against his intimate
partners .85
IV. IMPACT
By mandating trial judges to consider credible evidence of domestic
violence and giving priority to this factor over the other statutory factors
when such evidence is found, the North Dakota Supreme Court has
altered the long-standing process of weighing the best interest factors in
custody cases. Prior to the Heck decision, the best interests of the child
were determined by a customary weighing of statutory factors which
stood on equal footing. However, after Heck, if credible evidence of
domestic violence is presented, then the remaining best interest factors
take a back seat to the domestic violence issue.86
80. Heck, 529 N.W.2d at 164.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 164-65 (citing Anne Ganley et al., The Impact of Domestic Violence on the Defendant
and the Victim in the Courtroom, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN CRIMINAL
COURT CASES. A NATIONAL MODEL FOR JUDICIAL EDUCATION (Family Violence Prevention Fund 1991)).
83. Id. at 165. Heck introduced no evidence that he had considered or participated in any form
of treatment or counseling and the last incident of violence occurred within the last two years. Id.
84. Id. at 165 n.6.
85. Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155, 165 (N.D. 1995). In addressing Reed's smoking in the
presence of the children, one of which is asthmatic, the court endorsed the option of imposing a rigid
visitation schedule upon the smoking parent which requires the parent not to smoke in the child's
presence before terminating that parent's custodial or visitation rights. Id. at 165-66.
86. Some concern may be raised as to the continuing effect of Heck with Justice Levine's
retirement effective March 1, 1996. Any such concern seems unwarranted as Justice Levine's
interpretation of the rebuttable presumption has been cited by other North Dakota Supreme Court
Justices since Heck was decided as the standard by which custody cases involving credible evidence
of domestic violence are to be judged. See Helbling v. Helbling, 532 N.W.2d 650. 653 (N.D. 1995)
(Meschke, J.); Krank v. Krank, 529 N.W.2d 844, 848 (N.D. 1995) (Vande Walle, C.J.); Ryan v.
Flemming, 533 N.W.2d 920,923 (N.D. 1995) (Meschke, J.); Smith v. Smith, 534 N.W.2d 6, 11 (N.D.
1995) (Sandstrom, J.).
1996]
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Although the court in Heck recognized the priority given to the
domestic violence factor, it did not address the issue of what is required
to raise the presumption. Nor was the amount or extent of evidence
required to trigger the statutory presumption addressed in the 1993
amendment.8 7 In Krank v. Krank,88 the court recognized that, given the
wording, one act of domestic violence could be enough.8 9 Ultimately,
the court seemed to reject this interpretation. 90 In a subsequent case, the
court showed an unwillingness to find the presumption raised where the
alleged acts of domestic violence were remote in time and not of a
significant degree. 91 Consequently, it is unclear how extensive the
evidence of domestic violence must be in order to constitute credible
evidence sufficient to raise the presumption.
However, once the presumption is triggered, a trial court must
resolve the issue of the presence of domestic violence before the
"weighing," if ever, comes into play. It will not suffice to argue that all
or a majority of the other factors weigh in the perpetrator's favor. The
perpetrator must go above and beyond the customary weighing of the
factors and demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the best
interests of the child require the perpetrator serve as custodial parent.92
Although the court detailed how the statutory presumption operates,
it seemed to leave open the question of what exactly constitutes clear and
convincing evidence in order to rebut the presumption. At a minimum,
the court in Heck implied that proof of rehabilitation, in conjunction
with a passage of time involving no acts of domestic violence, could be a
start. 93 Such evidence, according to the court, may support a finding
that future domestic violence was unlikely. 94 It is hard to reconcile how
such a showing alone would require that the perpetrator have custody if
87. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) (1991 & Supp. 1995) (stating merely that a finding
of credible evidence of domestic violence will raise the rebuttable presumption).
88. 529 N.W.2d 844 (N.D. 1995).
89. Krank v. Krank, 529 N.W.2d 844, 850 (N.D. 1995).
90. Id. (citing Simmons v. Simmons, 649 So.2d 799, 801 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that a single
act of domestic violence was not sufficient to trigger the statutory presumption)).
91. Ryan v. Flemming, 533 N.W.2d 920, 923-24 (N.D. 1995) (stating that the instances of
violence were limited to acts against property, a broken flower pot and a telephone tom out of a wall,
which were devoid of allegations of any physical abuse).
92. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)6) (Supp. 1995) (detailing the consideration to be given
to credible evidence of domestic violence in determining the best interests of the child).
93. Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155,165 & n.6 (N.D. 1995). According to Ms. Bonnie Palecek of
North Dakota's Council on Abused Women's Services. domestic violence counseling programs vary
throughout the state in the kind of treatment available and the length of time required to complete such
programs. Telephone Interview with Bonnie Palecek, Executive Director of North Dakota Council on
Abused Women's Services, Bismarck, N.D. (Jan. 19, 1996). The Batterer's Treatment Forum has
recently completed a first draft of proposed standards for such programs, which will eventually be
distributed to judges as a guideline for determining appropriate treatment for perpetrators of domestic
violence. Id.
94. Heck, 529 N.W.2d at 165 & n.6.
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the victim is otherwise a fit parent. In Krank v. Krank95 the court
interpreted Heck as stating that a victim of domestic violence must be
deemed an unfit parent for the perpetrator to gain custody. 96 This seems
to be a plausible interpretation as the best interests of the child
undoubtedly would not require an award of custody to a perpetrator if
the other parent is deemed fit. In such a situation, the perpetrator's
participation as custodian hardly seems a necessity or a requirement for
the best interests of the child to be met.
The trial court in Heck applied the rebuttable presumption solely
against Heck and, as such, the North Dakota Supreme Court only
addressed the application of the rebuttable presumption in a situation
involving one perpetrator of domestic violence. 97 The possibility of a
situation involving two parents who have perpetrated domestic violence
was addressed by the court in Krank.98 In so doing, the court expanded
the application of the rebuttable presumption set forth in Heck and laid
out a rather awkward process for applying, or not applying, the
rebuttable presumption in such a situation. 99 If there is evidence of
domestic violence by both parents, then the trial court must measure the
amount and extent committed by both.100 If the amount and extent
committed by one is significantly greater, then the statutory presumption
applies only to the one who inflicted greater domestic violence.' 0 i If it is
roughly proportional and both are considered otherwise fit parents, then
the presumption will apply to neither.102 In such a situation, the trial
court may consider the remaining best interest factors.103 In essence,
both parents will have to provide the trial judge with a "scorecard"
comparing the domestic violence perpetrated by both in frequency and
severity.104
In detailing the application of the rebuttable presumption in a dual
perpetrator situation, the court in Krank did not discuss the possibility of
95. 529 N.W.2d 844, 848 (N.D. 1995).
96. Krank v. Krank, 529 N.W.2d 844, 848 (N.D. 1995) (citing Heck. 529 N.W.2d at 166 (Vande
Walle, CJ., concurring in the result)). But see Bruner v. Hager, 534 N.W.2d 825, 829 (N.D. 1995)
(Sandstrom, J., concurring in the result) (stating that the suggestion in Krank that the non-abusing
parent must be unfit in order to award custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence "is contrary to the
statute").
97. Heck, 529 N.W.2d at 158.
98. Krank, 529 N.W.2d at 848-49.




103. Krank v. Krank, 529 N.W.2d 844,850 (N.D. 1995).
104. See Bruner v. Hager, 534 N.W.2d 825, 829 (N.D. 1995) (Sandstrom, J., concurring in the
result) (stating that the implication that "the violence of [the] relationship should be somehow scored
like a boxing match, with the presumption applying only against the one scoring the most points, has no
basis in the statute").
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granting custody to a third party.105 Rather, importance was placed on
ultimately granting custody to one of the parents. The only possibility
for third party involvement seems to be if the mutual, roughly
proportional violence is so severe as to culminate in a termination of all
parental rights. 106 As such, the obvious conclusion is that custody will
nonetheless be given to a parent with a judicially recognized propensity
for violence.
In Heck, the North Dakota Supreme Court clarified that only
compelling or exceptional circumstances will rebut the presumption
against awarding custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence. 107 In
doing so, the court has ensured, to the extent judicially possible, that the
health and welfare of the child will be protected, unless, of course, the
child has two perpetrators for parents. In such a no-win situation, it
seems unlikely that the best interests of the child will ever truly be met.
Kathleen B. Garner10
8
105. See Krank, 529 N.W.2d at 850.
106. See id. at 851 (Meschke, J., concurring) (stating that both parents will be disqualified as
unfit only if the roughly proportional violence defeating the statutory presumption is so severe as to
render the child "so deprived that the proceedings turn to terminating all parental rights").
107. Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155,162 (N.D. 1995).
108. I would like to thank Professor Marcia O'Kelly for her guidance in writing this article, and
my husband, David, for his unyielding support and enthusiasm.
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